Recently, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of relief available to plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—the federal statute allowing for declaratory relief and damages against the government for violations of constitutional rights.
In Olivier v. City of Brandon, the Court addressed whether a prior conviction or sentence under a given ordinance will bar a suit against that same ordinance. The petitioner had been previously convicted of violating a municipal ordinance restricting him from engaging in expressive activities (in his case, street preaching) near a public amphitheater. Later, after paying the fines associated with the violation of this ordinance, the petitioner sought a court order declaring the ordinance unconstitutional under § 1983. No. 24-993, 2026 WL 783725, at *3 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2026).
On appeal, the Court evaluated whether Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) prevented the petitioner’s suit from going forward. In Heck, the Court held that § 1983 could not be used to obtain damages in a suit which required challenging “the validity of a prior conviction or sentence . . .” Olivier, 2026 WL 783725, at *3. Rather, the Court found in Heck that the proper avenue for recovery in those situations was a habeas corpus proceeding. A § 1983 action, therefore, would constitute a “collateral attack” on a prior conviction and intrude on the realm of habeas. Heck, 512 U.S. at 485.
On appeal, the City of Brandon, Mississippi argued that the Court’s decision in Heck prevented the petitioner from challenging an ordinance under § 1983 when he had already been convicted by that same ordinance. Afterall, reversing that ordinance under § 1983 would cast some doubt on the validity of Mr. Olivier’s prior conviction for violating the City’s ordinance.
But the Court held that Heck was inapplicable to Mr. Olivier’s situation. Olivier, 2026 WL 783725, at *3. Drawing on prior caselaw, the Court found that there was a clear difference between cases challenging the constitutionality of past convictions, and those seeking prospective relief under § 1983. Id., at *6.
The Court therefore found that Mr. Olivier could proceed under § 1983 “to enjoin future prosecutions under the city ordinance, despite his prior conviction. Were that not so, Olivier would face the . . . dilemma . . . flout the law and risk another prosecution, or else forgo speech he believes is constitutionally protected.” Id., at *8.
The choice that logically followed from the City of Brandon’s reliance on Heck—either engage in speech you believe is constitutionally protected and risk prosecution or forgo your speech entirely—was unacceptable to the Court.
The critical takeaway from Olivier v. City of Brandon is that the Court re-affirmed that § 1983 relief is available to civil rights plaintiffs even if they have been previously convicted by the law they are challenging. Even so, framing a complaint under § 1983 becomes critical. If the statute is seeking to challenge the constitutionality of past convictions under a given law, then Heck may be used to bar such claims as discussed above.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a powerful tool in any civil rights case. However, understanding the nuances of this statute are critical. The attorneys at Dalton & Tomich will continue to track the developments in this area of the law so that we can better serve our clients. If you are curious as to whether you may have a claim against a governmental entity for violation of your constitutional rights, we would be happy to discuss this with you.
